Issue #912 MISP/Redis Post-Realization Mutation Preflight

This note fixes the boundary for retiring the temporary MISP/Redis repair. It is guidance, not an implementation plan. The authoritative desired state is a released TechVault pack that passes the normal pack validation and admission path; APTL must not reconstruct that state from its legacy Compose file or the workaround.

Release Gate And Decision

Resolved. OpenRAE/env-packs#280 closed on 2026-09-16 and its fix shipped in raes-env-packs 6.1.0, which APTL now pins. That release authors the cache authorization (misp-redis-authorization, value-free redacted credential), MISP's database and cache upstream_bindings, the misp-db application role and grant, the misp-canonical-url setting, and the misp-authenticated-api-readiness evidence requirement behind a misp-authenticated-api-operation listener probe. The paragraph below records the state of the pinned 6.0.1 release at preflight time and is kept for the classification it establishes, not as a current blocker.

Because a pack is one immutable artifact, adopting 6.1.0 also adopts the Wazuh endpoint-agent contract released alongside #280 (per-host enrollment identity, retained /var/ossec/etc state, a wazuh-agents-ready precondition and a file_artifact evidence channel). That is consumed here rather than deferred.

The installed raes-env-packs==6.0.1 is not sufficient evidence to retire the workaround. Its realized MISP node has the expected MISP environment shape, including ADMIN_KEY as operator_secret, but the rendered node has no certificate delivery or retained-volume mount. misp-redis currently has no declared command/environment authentication shape. Those are exactly the classes repaired after realization today. Do not infer the next release's field names, values, classifications, certificate destinations, or persistence policy from docker-compose.yml or envpack-soar-fixups.sh; compare the released #280 pack with its classification and compilation output.

Once that release is admitted, the decision is:

• Every MISP, MariaDB, and Redis source/topology/dependency, command, environment/credential class, generated certificate/config output and destination, persistence policy/consumer, listener/publication, resource policy, readiness dependency, and MISP-to-Suricata integration is authored or intentionally open before DeploymentBackend.realize.
• Open values are selected only by the backend through the realization envelope and are disclosed as observed BACKEND_REALIZED provenance. Missing is not open, and an APTL product-keyed default is not a backend choice.
• scripts/envpack-soar-fixups.sh contains no reachable MISP/Redis mutation branch. It must neither remove/recreate a container nor reset a database or volume. seed-prime.sh remains content seeding only; it cannot repair infrastructure or downgrade a failed readiness result to a warning.

Required Contract Closure

The release must make these concerns visible through RAES's typed runtime and stateful contract; this table is a completeness check, not a second schema.

Concern	Required ownership and proof
MISP/Redis/MariaDB configuration	Runtime environment, command, dependencies, listeners, resource limits, and operational policy are pack-authored or explicitly open. The existing runtime-environment/command/readback gate rejects missing or substituted governed values.
Credentials	Scenario fixture credentials remain secret_fixture; deployable API/admin/Redis credentials are classified exactly as #280 specifies, with operator secrets bound from .env only after pre-side-effect validation. Never classify by a credential-looking name.
TLS and generated artifacts	The pack's certificate_bundle, selected outputs, exact MISP image destination, permissions, SAN/chain/key validation, and trust posture are authoritative. A mounted certificate is not evidence that MISP activated it; authenticated MISP readiness must prove the selected endpoint works.
Persistence/reset	misp_config, misp_data, and misp_db_data (or their released successors) use the typed stateful graph. Normal stop/start retains declared state; only the existing explicit volume-reset lifecycle removes it. Redis's persistence posture is explicit, not guessed from its image.
Runtime closure	Daemon/guest observation rejects omitted, changed, and injected governed environment, command, port/listener, capability, bind/tmpfs mount, local-control interface, and named-volume state. Subtract only the documented image Config.Env and fixed substrate baseline; do not create an APTL allowlist or use an environment-name prefix.
Readiness	Compose health is only a prerequisite. MISP readiness is authenticated service-native API proof using the admitted credential and selected TLS posture; Redis readiness proves the admitted authentication/command behavior; database readiness proves the admitted database path. A successful seed, TCP connect, login page, or unauthenticated PING is insufficient.

Named-volume excess is the current closure gap: _runtime_concern_excess closes bind/tmpfs mounts and _raes_stateful_observation proves declared named-volume mounts, but declared-only observation is not bidirectional closure. Extend the typed runtime/stateful observation surface if the released concern requires it; do not add docker inspect | grep or a MISP-specific post-start checker.

Required Reuse And Cross-Cutting Passage

Layer	Canonical incumbent and guardrail
Pack source and validation	src/aptl/core/scenario_bundle.py, raes_env_packs.validation.validate_pack, content manifest/digest validation, aptl.validation.techvault_gate.validate_scenario, and tests.helpers.techvault_scenario_bundle. Never edit the staged pack or add an APTL pack schema.
Admission and open values	AptlProvisioner, RuntimeManager.plan, interpret_provisioning_plan, RAES blocking diagnostics, build_aptl_realization_envelope(), BackendRealizationEnvelopeModel, and snapshot provenance. All governed requirements precede mutation; no shell/Compose first-time selection and no selected_values map.
Rendering and effective model	RuntimeConfiguration, DeploymentNodeRealization.runtime, _compose_node_generation._operational_config, stateful lowering/graph/realization, and generated Compose validation. The static docker-compose.yml is not desired-state authority.
Runtime/stateful readback	raes_runtime_observation, _raes_runtime_environment_observation, _runtime_concern_excess, _runtime_mount_observation, _raes_stateful_observation, raes_observation, and the SEM-218 non-approximation gate. Extend these typed observers, rather than a product DTO or direct Docker path.
Certificates	SOC_CERT_PROFILE, derive_soc_service_certs, ensure_soc_certs, _stateful_certificates, selected-output mounts, and certificate evidence. Preserve the separate internal trust and host-facing lab-CA consumer boundaries.
Lifecycle/backend operations	DeploymentBackend, local/SSH Compose backends, _compose_post_start, wait_for_realized_health, ReadinessPolling, and the shared lifecycle/reset owner. No raw Docker subprocess, recreation retry, volume deletion on failure, or local-only behavior.
Secrets, errors, evidence	load_dotenv, validate_required_env, find_placeholder_env_values, curl_safe, get_logger, redact, LabResult, RAES diagnostics, and RuntimeSnapshot. Use stable secret-free classifications and redacted summaries, not a MISP exception hierarchy or native-response envelope.

Security And Host-Layer Guardrails

• Parser/policy gates: RAES strict Pydantic/semantic SDL validation, env-pack manifest/digest validation, realization-envelope capability checks, and plan interpretation must reject unknown, unsupported, incomplete, or unbound requirements before backend mutation.
• Environment binding: derive required operator_secret names from the admitted runtime; validate missing/placeholder input through the canonical dotenv helpers before realize. Compose interpolation emits a validated binding; it is not itself validation. Do not expand Wazuh-specific EnvVars into a MISP schema.
• Secret/OS exposure: no token/password/private key in process argv, Docker command, environment dump, generated Compose, logs, diagnostics, snapshots, provenance, test failures, or raw HTTP bodies. Use the existing safe HTTP/0600-file path or a backend exec boundary that keeps secret input off host argv, and keep artifact output containment/permissions checks.
• Error/observability envelope: distinguish unavailable transport, TLS or endpoint mismatch, authentication rejection, datastore failure, unexpected runtime state, malformed response, and timeout with bounded reason codes. Evidence records endpoint identity, selected verification outcome, elapsed time, readback outcome, and provenance—not credential values or response payloads.
• Runtime/host closure: observe Docker image/container config, image-owned environment baseline, container environment/command, mounts/volumes, capabilities, listeners/networks, generated artifacts, persistent volumes, and loopback publication. An image default may not silently satisfy a scenario-governed concern, and no convenience host publication is allowed.

The extensibility seam is the existing typed RAES runtime/stateful model plus the envelope and RuntimeSnapshot.realization_provenance: the next service with an admitted open value or authenticated native readiness uses those generic surfaces. If image Config.Env or named-volume excess needs new readback, add it to DeploymentBackend/the typed observation model so local and SSH backends remain identical. Do not parameterize by product name or encode MISP/Redis defaults in APTL.

Proof Obligations And Boundaries

Regression coverage must establish: a fresh pack-backed realization reaches authenticated MISP, Redis, and database readiness without changing the realized container identities; normal persistence survives stop/start while the explicit reset removes it; omitted/substituted/injected environment, command, certificate mount, volume, listener, capability, or secret binding fails closed; and backend-selected open values are independently observed with correct provenance. Tests should build on pack-realization, runtime-observation, stateful-realization/readiness, seed-boundary, and live-gate patterns already in tests/, not shell-text assertions alone.

This issue does not repair general post-admission mutation enforcement (#915/

916), redesign MISP or Redis, change the scenario's released persistence or

TLS posture, add a generic service-probe framework, alter intentional fixture credentials, migrate static legacy Compose, or remove content seeders. Avoid copying workaround/legacy literals into new config; treating absence as open; using pack_interaction to inject deployment state; accepting health/TCP/seed success as readiness; conflating certificate presence with activation, API authentication with Redis authentication, or retained volume presence with correct state; and deleting retained data to make a failure disappear.